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RELATIONS IN ARISTOTLE  
Predicative propositions are the basic structure of a specific kind of term 
logic that can be traced back to Aristotle1. 
The difficulties it encompasses are evident.  
An obvious one is the framing of relations, as defined in the Aristotelian 
doctrine of categories, within this kind of logic.  
This difficulty can be summarized as follows: how can one reconcile the 
doctrine according to which every proposition has but two terms, a subject term 
and a predicate term, with Aristotle’s assumption of a category of relatives and 
therefore with the implication that “is” can introduce relations (“master of”, “in 
love with”, “son of”, etc.), whose correlates should apparently, in Aristotelian 
terms, be subjects (as in, for instance, “Plato is master of Aristotle” or “Socrates is 
son of Sophroniscus”), thus forming no longer a dyadic, but a triadic assertion? 
Despite the superficially thorny aspect of the question, the answer is, 
I think, relatively simple and the question itself can accordingly be seen to raise 
no genuine difficulty at all. 
In fact, as we could systematically check off if we were to analyse all of 
the types of predicative proposition generated according to each of the ten cate-
gories, a proposition expressing a relation, like 
(1) “Socrates is son of Sophroniscus” 
is not formally distinct from propositions where a quality, a location, an ac-
tion or indeed the essence of a subject are ascribed, as, for instance, in: 
(2) “Socrates is white”, 
(3) “Socrates is in Athens”, 
(4) “Socrates fought in the Peloponnesian War”, 
(5) “Socrates is a man”. 
                                                 
1 As is well known, the use of the term “proposition” may convey two rather differ-
ent interpretations: either the identification of propositions with the content (or, in the 
sense introduced by Frege, the meaning) of declarative sentences, taken to be the bearer or 
truth and falsehood; or its identification with declarative sentences themselves, understood 
as the truth-bearers. Understandably enough, the interpretation here adopted is always the 
former, for it is the one also assumed in traditional logic. 
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In all these propositions — and the one expressing a relation is no excep-
tion in this regard — there are two terms and two terms only: the subject and the 
predicate. The only changing element in each of those propositions is the mean-
ing of the predication, which varies according to that which the predicate states 
about the subject. In proposition (2), the predicate “white” states how Socrates 
is; in (3), the predicate “in Athens” states where Socrates is; in (4), the predicate 
“fought in the Peloponnesian War” states which action was performed by Socra-
tes; in (5) the predicate “man” states what Socrates is; and, exactly in the same 
way, in our controversial proposition (1), the predicate “son of Sophroniscus” 
states with whom Socrates is related by filiation.  
In the Aristotelian predicative propositions — whatever their categorical 
content may be, which is to say regardless of the type of predication introduced 
by the proposition —, there are always only two terms and relational predica-
tions (in the Aristotelian sense) constitutes no exception from this point of view. 
In Aristotle’s theory, propositions that introduce a relation have, exactly as any 
other proposition, a dyadic structure; and, through them, one predicate is attrib-
uted to one subject.  
Actually, it is not hard to understand why this is so. For Aristotle, catego-
ries correspond to the several types of question one can ask of a given substance 
concerning its being and, therefore, exhaust the various types of predicates that, 
in general, any substance may receive2. 
Now, the question typified by the category of relatives is the question πρός 
τι, “in relation to what?”. In this sense, the question introduced by the category 
of relatives is not that which asks about the relation one given subject maintains 
with another, but rather that which asks about the subject with which another 
subject maintains a specific relation. The specific question regarding relatives is 
not thus: “what is the relation between a and b?” (where a and b are subjects); 
but instead: “with whom does a have the relation R?”.  
Accordingly, that which is expressed by a relational predicate (in the Aris-
totelian sense of the term) is not a specific relation that a specific substance has. 
The relational predicate expresses that to which that substance is related under 
the specified relation. In proposition (1), for instance, “is” does not introduce a 
specific relation (viz., that of filiation) between Socrates and Sophroniscus; it 
introduces that to which (to whom, in this particular case) Socrates is related by 
filiation, namely Sophroniscus3. 
In this light, proposition (1) does not express the relation of filiation be-
tween Socrates and Sophroniscus (in which case the proposition would have had 
three terms), but rather states that Socrates is related, by filiation, to Sophronis-
                                                 
2 Cf. Cat. 4, 1b25-27. 
3 On this issue, see Cat. 7, 8a 13 – b 24. 
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cus, where “being related to Sophroniscus by filiation” constitutes a single predi-
cate that the proposition attributes to the subject. And, of course, this holds, in 
general, for every proposition analogous to (1).  
This being the case, the problem raised in the beginning should not worry 
us any more. Sadly, the solution itself is not, however, altogether innocuous and 
have some side effects on Aristotle’s theory of the proposition.  
Let us have a look at two of these effects. 
The first effect I would like to highlight concerns declarative sentences, 
particularly those that express relational propositions (in the Aristotelian sense of 
the term). If our account of relational propositions is right, then names that occur 
within the predicative term of such sentences possess reference and contribute to 
the reference of the term as a whole. This typically affects sentences with rela-
tional content, but not only them: think, for example, of locative assertions. 
The second effect is the following. Although every proposition must in-
clude at least one general term and therefore no proposition expresses a bare 
relation between individuals (a thesis rather intuitive in itself, but one that would 
require a great deal of time to fully justify here), relational propositions thus un-
derstood (as locative propositions, for that matter) alert us to the fact that, in a 
proposition, some relations between individuals may be implicitly involved. 
Such is indeed what paradigmatically happens in the case of propositions ex-
pressing relations. Let us again look at proposition (1).  In spite of the fact that it 
only includes two terms, viz., “Socrates”, the subject, which is a singular term, 
and “son of Sophroniscus”, the predicate, which is a general term, it seems rather 
plain that the predicate attributes to the individual subject a certain relation with 
another individual and, in so doing, notwithstanding its dyadic character, the 
proposition can be seen as ultimately introducing, by mediation of the predicate, 
a relation between individuals. 
Be that as it may, it seems clear enough that none of these effects disquali-
fies the doctrine according to which every predicative proposition, regardless of 
its particular categorical content, has but two terms and relational predications 
(in the Aristotelian sense) are no exception.  
However, this leads us to a further difficulty; and, this time, quite a genuine 
one.  
In fact, if Aristotle’s doctrine survives the challenge posed by the two said 
effects, it is not at all clear that it can also overcome the defiance posed by rela-
tions themselves — by which I now mean not relational predications in the Aris-
totelian sense, but real relations between objects (the extension of predicates of 
arity greater than 1, if you will). 
The new problem can be put as follows: subject/predicate logic, upon 
which the notion of predicative proposition rests, is incapable of accounting for 
relations, in the strong and proper sense of “relation”. To put it more incisively: 
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any discourse whose relations, in this sense, are ineradicable is impervious to 
subject / predicate logic. 
We can see this at two levels.  
Here is the first level: from the notion of proposition so defined it is only 
possible to account for an argumentative discourse, not for a narrative discourse. 
In order to understand it, let us take the following lines as an example: 
The car travelled from Moscow to Dmitrov. Once in Dmitrov, it 
travelled to Dubna. Later, it travelled back to Moscow4. 
Following the interpretation presented, we have here four propositions, 
which can be expressed by the following sentences:  
(6) “The car travelled from Moscow to Dmitrov” (where “the car” 
expresses the subject and “travelled from Moscow to Dmitrov” ex-
presses the predicate). In notation: Fa5. 
(7) “The car arrived in Dmitrov” (where “the car” expresses the 
subject and “arrived in Dmitrov” expresses the predicate). Let it be Ga. 
(8) “The car travelled to Dubna” (where “the car” expresses the sub-
ject and “travelled to Dubna” expresses the predicate). Let it be Ha. 
(9) “The car travelled back to Moscow” (where “the car” ex-
presses the subject and “travelled back to Moscow” expresses the 
predicate). Let it be Ja. 
The problem that becomes apparent in the translation is that we are left be-
fore a succession of predications with no relation among them, except for the 
fact that all share the same subject. The point of the narrative, i.e., the outline of 
the itinerary, vanishes completely. Its various stops are subsumed, and therefore 
diluted, into the predicates. 
Let us now consider the case of argumentative discourse. 
                                                 
4 For those who, even after the considerations already developed on the specificity 
of relational predications in Aristotelian-based logic, may feel inclined to dispute that the 
propositions here presented are predicative propositions, we would remind them that it is 
Aristotle himself who argues that all categorical assertions can be converted into predica-
tive propositions (or, perhaps better, clarified as predicative propositions): cf. Int. 12, 21a 
38 – b 10; Analyt. Pr. I 46, 51b 5 – 25; Metaph. Δ 7, 1017a 27–30. 
5 I chose to use standard notation of predicate logic in order to render the subse-
quent illustration more intuitive. I have, however, made two fundamental simplifications, 
which naturally follow from the nature of the doctrine of the proposition under debate: 
first, every predicate, including those that predicate logic sees as relational predicates, are 
interpreted as monadic predicates; second, every name (including descriptions) are assimi-
lated to proper nouns and therefore represented by an individual constant. 
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An example: 
The car travelled from Moscow to Saint Petersburg. Now, to travel 
from Moscow to Saint Petersburg is to make a long journey. There-
fore, the car made a long journey. 
Here, the notion of proposition fits perfectly, as rendered clear by the for-
malisation6. 
We have three propositions, namely, 
(10) “The car travelled from Moscow to Saint Petersburg” (where 
“the car” expresses the subject and “travelled from Moscow to Saint 
Petersburg” expresses the predicate). Let it be Fa.  
(11) “To travel from Moscow to Saint Petersburg is to make a 
long journey” (where “to travel from Moscow to Saint Petersburg” 
expresses the subject and “to make a long journey” expresses the 
predicate). Let it be ׊x (Fx → Gx). 
(12) “The car made a long journey” (where “the car” expresses the 
subject and “to make a long journey” expresses the predicate). Let it 
be Ga. 
The argument results thus: 
Fa, ׊x (Fx → Gx)├ Ga, 
which makes indeed a valid inference. 
Briefly, then, when we find ourselves before a narrative context, bringing 
the discourse back to the set of propositions that would allegedly constitute the 
meaning of its respective sentences renders the discourse unreadable and this is 
consequence of the fact that narrative discourses resist being analysed in terms of 
the proposition structure. It is only when we are dealing with an argumentative 
context that the discourse can be successfully analysed by looking into the 
proposition structure. 
Explaining why this is so would perhaps not require any special effort, but 
it undesirably would lead us astray from our intended course here.  
There is, however, no need to do it.  
In fact, were this all there was to it, no major problem would arise, in that 
the predicative proposition model would lose explanatory power in the context 
of narrative discourse, but not in the context of argumentative discourse, of 
which it could be recognised as a basic structure — even in the case of relations. 
This is not what happens, though. A few counter examples will suffice to 
show that relations, in the strong sense of the term, are ineradicable from argu-
                                                 
6 According to the simplification stated in the previous note, but assuming all con-
ventional rules concerning the translation of categorical assertions in predicate logic. 
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mentative discourse, and that, because of them, propositional structure is unable 
to account for the whole of the argumentative discourse. 
Let us consider the following: 
(13) Louis is Bernard’s twin. Now, Bernard is John’s twin. There-
fore, Louis is John’s twin. 
(14) The whale destroyed the ship7. Now, the ship was Jerome’s 
fortune. Therefore, the whale destroyed Jerome’s fortune. 
(15) The car went to Moscow. Now, Moscow is near Dmitrov. 
Therefore, the car went near Dmitrov. 
In any of these instances, the argument only obtains if the propositions’ 
predicate is severed into relation and object — or, equally, if the corresponding 
declarative sentence contains two singular terms connected by a general term. 
Now, this constitutes not only another limitation to the application range of 
predicative propositions, but indeed a fatal one, as well as to any term logic 
founded on them. And this means that (as has long been acknowledged) any 
such logic is necessarily limited — and limited, among other things, by its intrin-
sic inability to account for relations. 
That said, how is such inability to be justified, and to what extend does its 
resulting limitation constitute a drastic restriction for the intervention of the no-
tion of predicative proposition?  
In other words: how much room does that limitation leave to such interven-
tion? Does it leave a continuous and well-defined operating margin, within 
which predicative propositions may be used systematically and consistently, or, 
on the contrary, does that limitation outline a transversal boundary, of broken 
line and occasionally diffuse sections, leaving no room at all for the possibility 
of a consistent and systematic use? 
Impossible as it is, at this juncture, to provide a full answer to the first 
question (and consequently to all others), we can at least advance some elements 
towards answering it. 
Let me begin by a hypothesis of historical-philosophical tenor, a hypothe-
sis that appeals expressly to the model in which the theory of the predicative 
proposition and the logic built upon it were for the first time put forth in the 
Western culture: the Aristotelian system. 
The hypothesis is the following: within Aristotle’s system, the justification 
for what I have called “its intrinsic inability to account for relations” lies in the 
system’s insensitivity to propositions whose subjects are singular terms, and is 
rooted in the relative neglect that that system shows for arguments containing 
singular subject assertions. In fact, the very doctrine of proposition was devel-
                                                 
7 The example borrows from Strawson. On Referring. P. 321. 
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oped to service a logic that acknowledges only quantified sentences and where, 
therefore, there are no singular subjects8.  
It is true that Aristotle’s logical texts attest to singular-subject propositions — 
albeit not in a systematic manner, as would be the case in the subsequent logical 
tradition, and, at any rate, far more modestly than one could expect9. However, 
those propositions play no role in logic proper (i.e., in the inferential systems) and 
it is not because of them, but because of universal propositions, that the very doc-
trine of proposition is built and presented as a necessary preamble to that logic.  
That is why relations, as functions whose arguments are singular terms, are, 
and can be, overlooked by Aristotelian logic, and why such a logic does not need 
to overcome, break away from, or reformulate the framework set by the model of 
predicative propositions for purposes of accommodating atomic structures with 
more than two terms, that is to say with a structure other than subject / predicate.  
In short: the Aristotelian system does not include a logic of relations because 
it does not include any singular term logic to begin with. Aristotle’s logic is a logic 
of connections between universals; and this is why the predicative proposition 
structure provides it with the necessary and sufficient conditions for it to operate10. 
                                                 
8 The four propositional forms of Aristotelian syllogistic all involve universal terms 
and universal terms alone. In fact, they attribute, universaliter or particulariter, a univer-
sal predicate to a subject and only a subject which is itself universal can be predicated 
universaliter or particulariter. That is why we can speak meaningfully of “all men” or 
“some man”, but not of “all Socrates” or “some Socrates”. Aristotle himself explicitly 
testifies to this when he states: “But ‘Socrates’ is not said of many; that is why one does 
not say ‘every Socrates’ as one says ‘every man’” (Metaph. Δ 9, 1018a3-4). This point 
was first pointed out by Alexander of Aphrodisias (In Analyt. Pr. 100.11 Wallies) and was 
in modern times retrieved by Łukasiewicz, in La syllogistique d’Aristote. P. 24. That 
Aristotelian syllogistic does not allow for singular terms has been acknowledged by many 
commentators; see, especially, Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics (Ross). P. 289; 
Łukasiewicz. La syllogistique d’Aristote. P. 21, 24–25; Patzig. Aristotle’s Theory of the 
Syllogism. P. 6–8; Granger. La théorie aristotélicienne de la science. P. 125–126; Cor-
coran. Aristotle’s Natural Deduction System. P. 100.  
9 Examples can be found in two passages of the Prior Analytics (I 33, 47b 21–37, 
and II 27, 70a 16–38) and, in greater number, throughout the Topics. 
10 One could surely object that, by leaving out relations, Aristotelian logic is also 
leaving out second-order relations, without which some such connections between univer-
sals would not even be possible. Consider, for instance, the following argument: “Mortal 
has greater extension than Animal; Animal has greater extension than Man; therefore, 
Mortal has greater extension than Man”. How, one would ask, could this argument be 
taken as valid inference without recognising a status of relation to “having greater exten-
sion than”? Aristotle’s answer is implicit in his logical practice and consists in reabsorbing 
all those “relations” as alternative formulae of the copula, or its extensions (a model evi-
dently not exportable to first-order relations). 
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Let us now set a side the historical-philosophical approach and move on to 
a more general theoretical level, from which we can draw some conclusions 
likely to provide an answer to the other questions left unanswered earlier — and 
with these conclusions I will rest. 
Given the evidence presented thus far, we can easily grant, I think, that, in 
a framework as the one described, i.e., in the framework defined by those asser-
tions the doctrine itself considers relevant (universal subject assertions), all as-
sertions likely to occur within an argument can be brought back to the predica-
tive proposition structure and, thus, that the theory of the proposition suffices to 
encompass all arguments generated within it11. 
A system founded upon the predicative proposition structure (and not the 
Aristotelian system specifically, but any system that adopts this basic structure), 
although limited, might nevertheless be complete, in the given sense.  
Complete, that is within the limits it itself has defined, thus excluding sin-
gular terms; and in the given sense, that is in the sense of the system’s ability to 
refer all assertions and arguments it deems relevant to the proposition structure.  
Re-assimilation of singular assertions can then be carried out retrospectively, 
namely widening, by extension, the proposition’s scope so as to include singular 
subjects, excluding only those singular terms that occur in predicative place. 
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